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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, share repurchases have gained popularity throughout the world.1  A long 
literature argues that firms buy back stock for a variety of reasons, reasons which are generally 
characterized as beneficial to both shareholders and the economy.  One such key motivation is that 
buybacks are a mechanism by which managers can respond to perceived mispricing in the stock market.  
This view of buybacks in a signaling context is not only supported in surveys of chief financial officers 
(see for example, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005)) but also in numerous academic studies 
(two recent studies include Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004)).  Of 
course, other value-enhancing factors also appear to motivate why companies choose to repurchase 
stock.2  Taken together, these stories generally paint a positive image of share repurchases.3  The 
empirical evidence is clearly consistent with this view.4  In the short-run, the average initial market 
response to program announcements is positive.  In the long-run, there is evidence of long-horizon 
return drifts.  Recently, Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004) find evidence of positive earnings surprises after 
buyback announcements.    
Yet while an extensive literature portrays a favorable view of the economic role of repurchases, some 
surveys of corporate executives suggest an unexplored, alternative motivation.  Specifically, one reason 
that firms may announce a buyback program may be to mislead investors and, perhaps, in an indirect way, 
manipulate stock prices.  For example, in 1998, Institutional Investor reported survey results of CFOs as 
to why they repurchase stock.  Among the various choices was the category “to support the stock.”  
Given that outright manipulation is largely frowned upon by the SEC rule 10b-18, the fact that this 
                                                 
1 Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that from 1983-2000, spending by U.S. firms on share repurchases grew at a 
rate of about 20% per year.  This contrasts with the comparable growth rate in dividends of only 6%.  Compared 
to initial public offerings, aggregate repurchases over this period were nearly three times greater than the proceeds 
raised through IPOs.  
2 For example, buybacks are well-known to be a tax-efficient vehicle to return free cash flow to shareholders.  
Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that during the 1990s some companies began using buybacks as a form of 
dividend substitution.  Repurchases known as green-mail have also been used to defend against hostile takeovers.  
Repurchases are, by definition, a tool for managing capital structure and thus are a means for addressing 
accumulated earnings that otherwise disturb target debt-equity ratios or to reverse the equity-expanding dilution 
caused by the exercise of employee stock options (Jolls (1998), Fenn and Liang (2001) and Weisbenner (2000)). 
Dittmar (2000) summarizes these motivations and points out that a blending of motivations may be at work in any 
one case.  Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) also comment in greater detail as to why firms repurchase stock.  
3 One might argue that an exception to this positive generalization exists in the market-microstructure literature, 
beginning with the work of Barclay and Smith (1988).  This literature provides a theoretical basis that a negative 
wealth effect arises from share repurchases in an efficient market where investors rationally anticipate predatory 
trading behavior by well-informed management.  While theoretically plausible, the material impact of these issues 
is not clear. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the clearly negative value implications from this theory with the 
positive, initial market reaction generally observed.  Another example can be found in a more recent paper by 
Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2005).  They propose that firms in concentrated industries may choose to 
announce buybacks following the buyback announcements of competitors as part of a strategic reaction.   
4 Early examples include Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991).  More recent examples include 
Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2004), Oded (2005) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2005).   
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category received a response by at least some managers lends some credence to the notion that managers 
may be using repurchases in a way that deviates from conventional economic stories that are related to 
enhancing shareholder wealth.  
Further, suspicions have been raised as to the signaling content of open-market buybacks given the 
structural flexibility managers have to forego purchasing any shares, thus opening them for abuse as a 
form of “cheap-talk.”  In contrast to fixed-price and Dutch-auction tender offers, open market buybacks 
(by far, the most prevalent repurchase mechanism) are not firm commitments.  Several studies find that 
many programs go unfulfilled (Stephens and Weisbach (1998) consider U.S. cases while Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) report evidence for Canada).  This inherent flexibility affords 
managers the chance to initiate programs, even if their intention to acquire stock is not based on a 
perception of misvaluation or some other value-enhancing motive.  Not surprisingly, early work in the 
signaling literature by Comment and Jarrell (1991) finds open-market programs to be the least 
informative signaling mechanism available for reacquiring stock.5   
Direct measures of managerial intent regarding any transaction, of course, are unobservable.  Here, 
we consider earnings quality as a proxy for the propensity of managers to falsely signal or otherwise 
potentially mislead investors through a buyback program announcement.  This flows as an extension of 
an emerging literature regarding earnings management.  For example, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok (2004) argue that a relation may exist between earnings quality and managerial intent.  
Specifically, they reexamine the relation between earnings quality and future stock performance and 
assert that earnings management may reflect an intention by managers to manipulate investors.  This 
pressure to affect market prices may come from a variety of sources (not the least of which may in part be 
due to the structure of managerial compensation).  To the extent investors have a myopic view of 
earnings (for example, Hand (1990)) and fixate on reported earnings, thus overlooking the fundamental 
assumptions needed to justify those earnings, these strategies may have some efficacy.  Sloan (1996) 
points out that while management may make discretionary accounting decisions to inflate current 
earnings, the accruals used to accomplish this are not sustainable in the long-run.  Nevertheless, when 
organic earnings growth is not in line with the market’s expectation, managers may indeed be tempted to 
use accruals to inflate earnings and thus mislead investors (at least in the short-term). 
This behavior to affect market perception may arguably carry over into using open market buyback 
programs in a similar fashion to mislead investors, especially if prior attempts at rallying market support 
through inflated accruals have not boosted stock prices.  If the cost (direct and/or indirect to either 
                                                 
5 In fact, Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) provide a theoretical framework which suggests nearly all firms should 
be expected to adopt low-cost, flexible buyback programs.  In such a world, one would expect these 
announcements to lose signaling power. 
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management or to the firm) of announcing an open market program is low and investors are not able to 
discern the intention of company executives at the announcement, it may be the case that managers, aware 
of their otherwise positive signaling effects, will consider share repurchases as another mechanism with 
which to mislead investors and boost stock prices.6   
We investigate this alternative view of buybacks by considering the quality of a firm’s reported 
earnings around the time of a buyback announcement.  Some key questions of interest are: 1) given that 
we cannot directly verify managerial intent, is there any evidence which suggests that the managers of 
buyback firms with low earnings quality are under pressure to boost stock prices?, 2) do we find any 
evidence that investors recognize this pressure and react accordingly?, and 3) is the operating and 
long-run stock return performance of suspect buyback firms worse compared to the generally favorable 
case?   
We examine a sample of 7,725 open market repurchases announced in the U.S. between 1980 and 
2000.  Generally speaking, managers who use aggressive accounting techniques do indeed appear to be 
under pressure to take action to reverse what is otherwise a negative information environment; 
immediately prior to the announcement of a repurchase, these firms are experiencing problems including 
a relatively sharp decline in abnormal stock returns.  Sales are dropping, realized earnings announcement 
returns are significantly negative and financial analysts on average are making negative forecast revisions 
with respect to future earnings.  Looking at the managers themselves in these low earnings quality firms, 
they tend to exercise executive stock options at higher rates and also tend to own more vested, exercisable 
options than managers of other buyback firms.   
These results paint a picture which suggests that managers could be prone to use an open market 
repurchase program in a manner that might mislead investors.  In the short-run, we find that, consistent 
with the evidence regarding earnings myopia, the market does not sort out differences in earnings quality 
across buyback programs as they are announced.  In both high and low earnings quality firms, the initial 
market reaction is about the same, slightly higher than 2%. 
In the long run, the results are generally consistent with the notion that managers may have been 
using buybacks as a means of generating market support.  The operating performance of low earnings 
quality firms significantly deteriorates after a buyback announcement.  For stock returns, in contrast to 
what we see more generally in stock buybacks, the long-horizon return performance of poor earnings 
quality firms is not significantly different from zero.  When we focus more narrowly on more suspicious 
cases where one might expect managers to be more desperate, our findings generally strengthen.   
                                                 
6 In a recent talk, Jensen (2005) strongly argues that earnings management is unethical and akin to “lying.”  While 
this may perhaps be an extreme view, his argument lends support to the notion that managers who adopt aggressive 
accounting practices may be doing so in an attempt to mislead investors.  
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This conclusion runs counter to a well-established literature which commonly portrays repurchases 
in a generally beneficial light.  In at least a portion of buyback cases (and in a manner consistent with 
what some of the literature has suggested with respect to these weak signals), managers appear intent on 
taking advantage of positive signaling effects from buyback programs which investors are not able to 
discern in the short-run.  Just as managers in the short-run are able to manipulate earnings to their 
advantage, it also appears that some companies may be using share buyback announcements as low-cost 
signals with which to mislead investors.   
Of course given that we do not have true insight into managerial intent, it is possible that some 
alternative explanation might be able to explain the results we find for poor earnings quality firms.  For 
example, managerial hubris is one such possibility; managers in these poorly performing firms may in 
fact have misguided or over-inflated views as to the value of the firm and thus may be prone to announce 
a share buyback which they truly consider a value-enhancing decision.  Yet, the result that poor earnings 
quality firms actually buy back less than other buyback firms and that executives in poor earnings quality 
firms exercise more stock options than others before the buyback announcement are inconsistent with 
managerial hubris being a dominant factor.  As a final check, we consider whether other explanations 
might account for our findings.  The results support the conclusion that in at least some cases, managers 
may be misleading the market.  While there is no impact in the long-run as one would expect, these 
misleading signals appear to have some efficacy in the short-term.   
The next section describes the data and methodologies.  Section 3 presents summary statistics 
including announcement returns and firm characteristics.  Section 4 reports long-run stock return and 
operating performance.  In Section 5, we consider alternative return estimation models and also 
investigate alternative explanations such as undervaluation, distributing free cash flow, increasing 
leverage, and reversing dilution from employee stock options.  We summarize the paper in Section 6. 
 
2. Data and methods 
2.1 Sample formation 
We form a sample of open-market repurchase announcements from two sources.  The first is from 
the Wall Street Journal Index for the period 1980-1990; the second is from Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) which begins comprehensive coverage in 1985.  We evaluate return and operating performance 
four years subsequent to the buyback announcement and thus terminate our sample at the end of 2000.  
We eliminate firms whose return information is not present on CRSP or whose accounting information is 
not available on annual Compustat.  To reduce time clustering, we eliminate announcements that 
occurred in the fourth quarter of 1987.  To avoid the impact of skewness in our long-run return estimates, 
we exclude firms whose share price at the time of repurchase announcement is below $3 (Loughran and 
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Ritter (1996)).  The final sample includes 7,725 separate cases. 
2.2 Measuring earnings quality 
Accounting accruals are a common measure of earnings quality (Beneish and Vargus (2002), Chan, 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2004)).  Accruals are derived from an accounting identity which links 
earnings and cash flows.  Specifically, earnings are equal to cash flows plus accruals.  The intent of 
accruals is to allow those preparing accounting statements to make adjustments that deviate from cash 
flows; deviations which, in their opinion, better reflect the firm’s fundamental operations.  While 
standards are in place governing how these accruals are determined, a substantial degree of subjectivity 
exists.  This flexibility provides an opportunity for executives to potentially distort reported earnings.   
In a purely efficient market, these maneuvers are argued to be ineffectual.  Yet, a rich literature 
including Hand (1990) and Sloan (1996) argues that investors appear to “fixate” on reported earnings and 
either ignore or are unaware of the accruals affecting these earnings which may be less likely to recur in 
the future.  A recent paper by Dechow and Ge (2005) lends credence to the idea that investors may 
misunderstand the transitory impact of special accounting adjustments on earnings.  To the extent that 
firms rely more heavily on this source of earnings, managers may be able to guide or shape investor 
behavior.  Eventually though, if a firm is reporting high earnings due to high discretionary accruals, a 
large portion of this result may not be sustainable.   
To gauge earnings quality, we follow Sloan (1996) and Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 
(2004) to define accruals in equation (1), with Compustat annual item numbers in parentheses.  
Accruals = (∆CA – ∆Cash) – (∆CL – ∆STD – ∆TP) – DEP (1) 
 
where ∆CA = change in current assets (4) 
 ∆Cash = change in cash (1) 
 ∆CL = change in current liabilities (5) 
 ∆STD = change in debt included in current liabilities (34) 
 ∆TP = change in taxes payable (71) 
 DEP = depreciation and amortization expense (14) 
 
Accruals are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the repurchase announcements.  We assume a 
four-month reporting lag to avoid look-ahead biases and scale all accruals by average total assets (TA).   
One shortcoming of this approach is that some portion of total accruals is not discretionary, but 
rather is tied directly to firm growth.  For instance, as high growth firms increase in scale, one expects to 
observe increases in accounts receivable and inventories.  To the extent that there are not off-setting 
changes in current liabilities, these findings may lead to high accruals.  To control for this, we follow 
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convention in the earnings management literature and decompose accruals using the Jones (1991) model  
i
i
i
i
i
ii
i
TA
PPE
a
TA
Sales
a
TA
a
TA
Accruals ε++∆+= 210 1 ,   (2) 
 
where ∆Sales is the change in sales (Compustat annual item number of 12) and PPE is property, plant and 
equipment (Compustat annual item number of 7).  Consistent with prior work, we define 
non-discretionary accruals (NDA) as the fitted values from this model for a given firm.  Discretionary 
accruals (DA) are thus defined as the residual for this case away from its expected value.  We follow 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) and estimate model (2) each year for each of the 48 Fama-French (1997) 
industries using all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks.7   We then compute NDA and DA for each 
repurchase firm as:  
 
iiii TAPPESalesNDA /)ˆˆˆ( 210 ααα +∆+=       iiii NDATAAccrualsDA −= /  (3) 
 
We create relative measures of earnings quality by calculating DA values for each firm with available data 
on Compustat.  Quintile cutoff points are then defined across this universe each year, thus allowing us to 
identify DA quintile ranks for each sample firm. 
2.3 Measuring abnormal long-run stock returns 
 We estimate abnormal stock performance both prior to and subsequent to a buyback announcement 
using a variety of techniques.  Because of its ability to provide a more meaningful interpretation, much 
of our analysis relies on an annual buy-and-hold returns approach (BHRs).  Barber and Lyon (1997) 
point out that the implied investment strategy from this procedure is both feasible and replicable, and 
seemingly indicative of what a long-horizon investor might earn.  For each sample firm, a benchmark is 
formed using five firms with comparable market-cap and book-to-market ratio.  Statistical inferencing is 
accomplished via a bootstrap method as advocated by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999).  The details of this 
rather standard method are described more fully in the Appendix.   
2.4 Measuring abnormal operating performance  
We evaluate operating performance using a variety of metrics including earnings, accruals, cash 
flows and sales.  We also consider performance using Return on Assets (or ROA) and use this measure 
to identify a matching control-firm from which to estimate abnormal operating performance.  Here, ROA 
is defined as EBITDA (operating income before depreciation, Compustat item 13) scaled by average total 
assets.  The choice of EBITDA is recommended by Barber and Lyon (1996) and is commonly adopted in 
many papers which evaluate operating performance (for example, Jain and Kini (1994) for IPOs, 
                                                 
7 For two-digit industries with less than 10 firms in a given year, we parameterize the model using coefficients estimated from 
all available firms at that time.   
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Loughran and Ritter (1997) for SEOs, Grullon and Michaely (2004) for repurchases).   
We define abnormal operating performance by taking the ROA of each buyback firm and subtracting 
the concurrent ROA of a matching firm based on industry and pre-event performance.  More specifically, 
we identify matching firms for a given target by locating all firms with the same two-digit SIC code and 
then choosing the company with the closest pre-event ROA as that of the sample firm.  We require that 
the matching firm’s pre-event ROA is within the range of (80%, 120%) of the sample firm’s pre-event 
ROA.  Since the ROA for some sample firms is close to zero, this approach may be overly restrictive.  
In these cases, we check for pre-event ROA to be within ± 0.01 of that of the target firm.  If no match is 
identified at this point, we relax the industry requirement to the 1-digit SIC industry and repeat the above 
steps.  If this fails, we remove the industry requirement, search across all firms, and identify the firm 
with the closest match, thus minimizing the following condition8: 
                firm matching 1,-tfirm sample 1,-t ROAROAmin −  (4) 
 
3. Firm characteristics around share repurchase announcements 
3.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary information for firms in our sample.  Panel A reports summary 
information for the overall sample period as well as two sub-periods. The average five-day 
announcement-period abnormal return is 1.79% and significantly positive, although the mean return is 
lower in the more recent sub-period.   
Consistent with earlier studies, firms announcing buyback programs are generally poor performers 
prior to the announcement, a result that is in sharp contrast to firms choosing to issue stock.  The mean 
raw return for sample firms in the year prior to the announcement is 1.80%; adjusted for size and 
book-to-market effects, the abnormal return is -12.58%.  The mean intended buyback amount is about 
7.5% of the share base.  Panel A also reports mean rank characteristics for size, B/M and discretionary 
accruals.  Generally speaking, the typical buyback firm in our sample is similar to the underlying 
universe with respect to market-cap, B/M, and their use of accruals.  
Panel B reports evidence similar to Panel A, but conditioned on discretionary accruals (DA) quintiles.  
For firms ranked in the highest or most aggressive DA quintile, the unexpected accrual is +13.7% of their 
total assets.  Interestingly, the average year -1 raw return for these firms is quite low, -11.5%.  On an 
                                                 
8 Among repurchase firms with valid ROAs, 73.3% find a match using a 2-digit SIC-code industry and ROA filter, 
9.8% find a ROA filter-matched firm within the 1-digit SIC-code industry level.  Further, 4% meet the ROA filter 
restriction but not industry requirement.  The remaining 12.8% of repurchase firms are matched without an 
industry filter according to equation (6). 
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adjusted basis, these firms show dramatically poor abnormal performance relative to the other firms in the 
year prior to the announcement.  This result is consistent with the notion that compared to the general 
case, managers in high DA firms may have been under greater pressure to reverse a sagging share price.   
Turning to the immediate market reaction to the buyback announcement, there is no clear pattern in 
announcement returns between high and low DA groups; the stock market does not seem to pay attention 
to the earnings quality of firms when they announce a share repurchase.  Here, for both high and low DA 
groups, the announcement-period abnormal return is about the same (slightly over 2%) with no significant 
difference between the groups.  Although not reported here, we examine this conclusion more carefully 
using multivariate regression analysis to control for various factors including, for example, market-cap 
effects and the overall size of the buyback program.  We find no evidence that the market distinguishes 
among programs of varying earnings quality.   
As a further examination as to whether we might better identify firms under pressure to announce a 
buyback program, we subdivide High DA firms into two groups on the basis of their abnormal stock 
performance in the quarter preceding the buyback announcement.  Here, we see that High DA firms with 
relatively poor prior abnormal performance (High-L) lost more than 20% of their market-cap in the 
preceding year; on a relative basis, these firms underperformed by -40%.  Among these more extreme 
cases, the mean 5-day abnormal market response was 2.3%.  This point estimate is not lower, but rather 
slightly higher compared to the High-H subset; the difference in market reaction between the two 
sub-groups is not significant at conventional confidence levels. 
3.2 Operating performance, earnings announcement effects and earnings forecast revisions  
To better understand the overall performance of repurchasing firms with low earnings quality, we 
turn our attention to operating performance prior to the buyback announcement.  In Figure 1, we plot the 
t ime-ser ies  pat tern of four operating performance measures: earnings (operating income after 
depreciation), accruals, cash flows (earnings minus accruals), and sales for five fiscal years prior to the 
announcement.9  In Panel A of Figure 1, we focus on the two extreme DA quintiles.   
For the highest DA quintile firms, earnings significantly increase before the announcement of a share 
repurchase even though sales are actually decreasing during the pre-announcement period.  Further, 
while earnings are increasing, cash flows are dropping in years -2 and -1.  By definition, it is the high 
accruals that these firms are employing that allow them to maintain comparatively high earnings even in 
the presence of declining sales and cash flows.  While it is difficult to appreciate all the reasons why 
managers in high DA were adopting aggressive accounting conventions, the evidence is consistent with 
the general story that they were under pressure to manage earnings in the face of what was otherwise 
declining operating performance.   
                                                 
9 Each of these measures is scaled by average Total Assets over the year. 
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Conversely, for firms ranked in the lowest DA quintile, we see a mild decrease in reported earnings 
over this same period of time.  Sales, however, are rather flat and cash flows are actually rising quite 
rapidly.  The mild decrease in earnings in a rising cash flow environment is explained by high negative 
accruals.  These are firms with comparatively conservative accounting practices.      
In Panel B, we plot operating results for the highest DA quintile conditioned into two sub-groups on 
the basis of the abnormal return in the quarter prior to the announcement.  For High DA firms with low 
prior abnormal returns (High-L), cash flows fall more than otherwise.  Moreover, their accruals and 
reported earnings show more dramatic growth compared to the High-H sub-group.  This is consistent 
with the idea that among all High DA firms, managers with poor return performance prior to the buyback 
announcement may have been under even greater pressure compared to High DA firms in general.    
In Table 2, we turn attention to the market reaction to quarterly earnings announcements preceding 
the buyback to gauge how the market is reacting to the release of operating performance.  To the extent 
that these news releases are not anticipated, we gain some sense of market surprise.  Panel A reports 
earnings announcement returns for each of the four quarters prior to buyback announcement for the 
lowest and highest DA quintiles.  We see some evidence that the average earnings announcement return 
is less favorable for the highest DA quintile firms in the year prior to the buyback announcement.  This 
is particularly true in the quarter immediately prior to the buyback announcement.  Here, the average 
abnormal market return for the lowest DA quintile is -0.11% and not significantly different from zero.  
On the other hand, the average abnormal return of the highest DA quintile is -0.99% (t-statistic = -4.35).  
On average, the market is receiving a negative information shock for High DA firms just prior to the 
buyback announcement.  Not surprisingly, if we focus more narrowly on the High-L sub-group, the 
disappointment in the earnings release just prior to the buyback announcement is worse.     
In Panel B of Table 2, we investigate how equity analysts are revising their forecasts.  Here, we 
report the proportion of negative abnormal quarterly earnings forecast revisions for the lowest and highest 
DA quintile firms in the year preceding the buyback announcement.  We examine revisions based on 
both the average and the median earnings per share (EPS) estimate.10  The results show that analyst 
opinion is running pessimistic in High DA firms; a result consistent with the return evidence reported 
earlier.  This trend in High DA firms accelerates in the two quarters preceding the buyback 
announcement.   
Consistent with the poor earnings announcement return in the quarter prior to buyback initiations, 
these results suggest that both investors and financial analysts are disappointed in the months preceding a 
                                                 
10 Abnormal forecasts revisions are calculated by subtracting the average change in analysts’ average (median) EPS 
forecasts during all months available at the IBES data (excluding months -6 to 6 around the month end of the 
calculation), from the average (median) forecast revision. 
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buyback announced by firms using aggressive accounting policies.  Even though these firms are 
generating comparatively high reported earnings, these earnings are driven to a large degree by 
managerial discretion.  Between High-L and High-H, we do not find any significant difference in 
negative abnormal earnings forecast revisions during the quarter before the announcement – both groups 
show a rather large increase in negative forecast revisions. 
Overall, the evidence here is consistent with the idea that managers in high DA firms in our sample 
may have been under pressure to reverse an otherwise negative trend in market events.   
3.3 Executive stock options 
 As a final consideration as to whether managers in low earnings quality firms might also be feeling 
pressure at a more personal level, we evaluate both option exercise activity as well as unexercised option 
ownership positions during the two fiscal years around the buyback.  S&P’s ExecuComp provides 
compensation information for the top 5 executives of the firms in S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P 
SmallCap 600 indices.  While this covers only a portion of our sample, we consider those firms which 
are followed in this database and report the results in Table 3.   
Both the chief executive officer alone and the top five executives together of the highest DA quintile 
firms (especially those in High-L sub-group) exercise a significantly greater amount of stock options 
during the fiscal year before the announcement compared to those of the lowest DA quintile firms (0.17% 
vs. 0.09% for CEOs and 0.37% vs. 0.26% for top five executives).  Considering that the vast majority of 
shares acquired through executive option exercises are sold almost immediately (Ofek and Yermack 
(2000)), this would seem to indicate that top managers of the highest DA quintile firms are largely 
reducing their equity exposure prior to a buyback announcement.  During the year of buyback program, 
this selling pressure is not quite so evident.  These results suggest that in the year prior to the 
announcement of the buyback program, managers of low earnings quality firms seemingly did not behave 
in a manner consistent with the undervaluation hypothesis.  They are exercising options at a 
comparatively higher rate despite the fact that these contracts are becoming less in-the-money due to poor 
stock returns prior to buyback announcements.   
Turning to overall unexercised, vested option holdings (which would include both in-the-money and 
out-of-the-money options), we see that ownership is comparatively greater in High DA firms in both the 
year preceding and the year of a buyback announcement.  This is again consistent with the idea that 
managers of low earnings quality were indeed incentivized to pay attention to stock prices; their decision 
to be aggressive in reporting earnings may have been in response to a general sense of pressure or need to 
support their share price.     
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4. Long-run Performance and Actual Buyback Activity 
 The evidence to this point suggests that managers in buyback firms with low earnings quality may 
very well be under pressure to take some action or set of actions to stop negative sentiment in the market.  
Very poor stock returns, deteriorating operating performance, negative earnings announcement effects, 
negative revisions of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, and more option exercises and holdings by 
managers prior to buyback announcements are consistent with this view.  In the short-run, we see no 
evidence that the market reaction is any different between high and low DA firms.  While it is possible 
that our use of discretionary accruals as a proxy for manager intent may be quite noisy, the results suggest 
that in the short-run, the market is not recognizing and responding differently to these potentially 
manipulative behaviors by management.  
In this section, we consider long-run return and operating performance evidence.  A rich literature 
reports evidence of improved performance subsequent to a buyback announcement, particularly with 
respect to abnormal stock performance.  This result is consistent with the idea that, generally speaking, 
buyback programs are beneficial to shareholders and motivated by some meaningful economic benefit.  
On the other hand, to the extent that a sub-set of buybacks is manipulative in intent, we do not expect to 
find this same general evidence.  Absent some fundamental economic benefit, we do not expect to 
observe any material long-term abnormal performance for High DA firms, either operationally or 
measured by stock performance.  
4.1 Long-term stock performance 
Table 4 shows the long-term buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) of sample firms.  Consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995)), we see a turn-around in abnormal returns 
surrounding a buyback announcement for the overall sample.  While the average prior one-year 
abnormal return is -12.6%, the average compounded four-year post-announcement abnormal return is 
15.6%.  When long-term performance is conditioned by DA quintile, we find strikingly different results.  
For Low DA firms which are considered to have high earnings quality, the four-year post abnormal return 
is 36.9%, with the p-value of 0.000.  Conversely, for the highest DA quintile, the long-term abnormal 
return is 7.8%.  This amount is much lower and not significantly different from zero at conventional 
confidence levels.  Moreover, we also observe a monotonically negative relationship between the DA 
quintile rank and long-term abnormal performance. These results suggest that earnings quality is an 
important factor associated with long-run return performance.  In fact, the highest DA quintile is the only 
group reported here which does not show a statistically significant long horizon drift.  When the highest 
DA quintile is further divided into two groups based on the stock performance in the quarter prior to 
buyback announcement, we find more striking differences.  For High-L firms where management may 
have been under greater pressure, the average abnormal return four years after the announcement is 
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negative, -5.8%.  Yet for High-H firms, the four-year post-announcement drift is positive and significant, 
21.6% (p-value = .044). 
This result is consistent with the idea that the motivation for announcing a buyback in these low 
earnings quality firms, especially those with poor stock performance, may differ from the more general 
case with better earnings quality.  In Panels B and C, this conditional evidence is reported separately for 
two sub-periods, 1980-1990 and 1991-2000.  The evidence, generally speaking, is stable between the 
two sub-periods.11   
4.2 Operating performance 
Table 5 reports the operating performance for the lowest and highest DA quintile firms.  Panel A 
reports median unadjusted ROAs while Panel B reports industry adjusted performance.  Panel C 
cumulates this abnormal performance in the post-announcement period.  Taken together, there are 
noticeable differences in operating performance between the two extreme DA groups.  Low DA firms 
show a dramatic increase in relative operating performance after the buyback announcement.  For 
example, while abnormal ROA in year -1 is zero (by definition), it jumps to +1.71% in year 1 and further 
to +3.06% in year 2.  Conversely, we do not see such a rebound in High DA firms.  Instead, relative 
operating performance for firms using aggressive accounting practices at the time of buyback 
announcement decreases from zero to -.86% in year 1 (p-value = .006).  In year 2, the point estimate 
increases slightly although the result is not statistically significant.    
When we focus more narrowly on High-L firms where suspicion about managerial motives is greater, 
poor performance is indeed quite noticeable in years +1 and +2.  Here, the abnormal ROA in these two 
years is -1.62% (p-value = .002) and -2.30% (p-value = .007), respectively.  For this group, the point 
estimates continue to remain disappointing in years +3 and +4.  
Panel C suggests that when measured cumulatively, we see meaningful differences, both statistically 
as well as economically, in operating performance between Low and High DA firms.     
4.3 Actual buyback activity 
We have been using earnings quality as a proxy to measure the potential of managers to manipulate 
or mislead investors.  To the extent that there is less of an economic reason supporting these cases (and 
that monitoring actual buyback activity is difficult for investors to accomplish), our hypothesis suggests 
that low earnings quality firms should repurchase fewer shares than other firms.  This would be 
particularly so if the share repurchase was narrowly intended to be a false signal to the market.   
                                                 
11 Although not reported here because of space constraints, we also estimated return evidence for the High-L 
sub-group in these two sub-periods.  Consistent with the manipulation story, we find no evidence of the more 
generally positive return drift for this group; the mean abnormal return drift is marginally negative.  As a check to 
verify that these findings are not driven by extreme cases, we also estimated this analysis winsorizing the top and 
bottom 1% of the sample.  The results are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
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To investigate this, we evaluate actual buyback activity for sample firms during the year following 
the program announcement.  Here, we estimate the actual buyback amount from the funds used to 
redeem stock on Compustat after adjusting for concurrent changes in preferred stock, (the same method 
described in Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Dittmar (2000)).  Although Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) show that this method is biased upward, they argue it is the preferred approach for deciphering 
actual repurchase activity.12  
Due to data limitations with this variable in Compustat, our sample is reduced to 6,365 observations.  
Panel A of Table 6 reports actual buyback dollar volume divided by average market-cap during the first 
year after the repurchase announcement, the intended number of shares announced in the program relative 
to total number of shares outstanding, and the ratio of the actual buyback amount to the intended 
amount.13  The results show that, generally speaking, firms on average purchase between 58% and 60% 
of their intended buyback amount during the first year of the program.  For High DA firms though, the 
results are more modest.  Here, the first-year completion rate is roughly 54%.  The difference in 
completion rates between the highest and lowest quintile groups is significantly different from zero.  
While the point estimate for intended program size is slightly higher for High DA firms, the lower 
completion rate appears to be affected by significantly lower actual buyback activity.  As before, we also 
report separate results for the two sub-groups within the High DA quintile.  Consistent with the notion 
that managers under a higher degree of pressure may choose to provide a false signal, completion rates in 
High-L firms are below that of High-H firms.   
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) document that firm characteristics, such as prior returns and cash 
flows, may affect the amount of stock firms choose to repurchase.  To check whether this might be 
affecting our findings, we perform Tobit regressions of actual buyback amount14, the results of which are 
reported in Panel B of Table 6.  Consistent with the more general economic motives one might expect 
such as a desire by management to respond to mis-pricing and/or adjust leverage, the regressions show 
that firms with large repurchase programs and high book-to-market ratios tend to buy back more stock in 
the first year of the program.  Consistent with Stephens and Weisbach (1998), cash is also an important 
factor.  Yet after controlling for these economic factors, High DA firms still tend to buy back less stock 
than one would otherwise expect.  Even when we assume some degree of foresight by adding into the 
regression the future four-year abnormal return (a variable with strong power), the negative relationship 
between DA and buyback activity does not change.   
                                                 
12 Further, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) also find that a substantial portion of buyback activity occurs in the first 
year of the buyback program. 
13 As in Stephens and Weisbach (1998), we truncate extreme values of the actual to intended buyback ratio to 
between zero and 100 percent for a given firm.  This truncation motivates our use of Tobit rather than OLS 
regression analysis in Table 6. 
14 Tobit regressions using the actual to intended ratio produce qualitatively similar results.  
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Clearly, we find evidence that High DA firms do repurchase shares, a result which suggests that 
management in this subset was not completely intent on misleading investors by conveying false signals.  
On the other hand, our metric of managerial intent is noisy and a variety of factors may be working in 
these cases.  Taken collectively, the evidence would seem to indicate that some other factor aside from 
distributing free cash flow, responding to mispricing or altering capital structure is motivating buybacks 
in cases where managers are using aggressive accounting practices.  The results in Table 6 suggest that 
managers in firms with low earnings quality appear to be behaving in a manner consistent with the 
manipulation story.   
 
5. Alternative explanations for the performance of low earnings quality firms 
In general, firms announcing a stock buyback show deteriorating operating and stock market 
performance prior to the announcement.  The evidence in Section 3 indicates that the decline is more 
profound in firms which employ aggressive accounting practices.  While it is indeed the case that 
reported, bottom-line earnings (comparatively) are not suffering due to the use of aggressive accruals, 
both unadjusted as well as normalized pre-announcement stock returns are noticeably worse for these 
special cases.  General operating performance is falling and both investors and analysts appear to be 
revising their expectations downward. These results are consistent with the notion that this sub-set of 
managers who made discretionary decisions to report poor quality earnings were under greater pressure to 
boost stock prices prior to their buyback announcement. 
While the evidence to this point is seemingly consistent with the manipulation story, it is plausible 
that alternative explanations might be at work.  For example, given that managerial intent is 
unobservable, one cannot casually rule out undervaluation as a driving motive.  Poor pre-announcement 
performance has been argued in other papers as direct support of the mispricing hypothesis, one of the 
more popular contentions for why managers buy back stock.  In addition, skeptics often raise concern 
that long-term stock performance is subject to “bad model problems” as pointed out by Fama (1998).  
On a related point, discretionary accruals more generally have been argued as an underlying factor priced 
in the cross-section.   
In this section, we explore some robustness issues relating to the manipulation story.  We begin 
with a robustness check of the return evidence to address the bad model problem.  Next, we dig deeper 
into considering whether conventional theories such as free cash flow, mis-pricing or altering capital 
structure can explain the evidence we are seeing for poor earnings quality firms.  
5.1.1. Bad model problems 
A potential problem with the BHAR approach is that the empirical bootstrap used to evaluate 
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statistical significance may suffer from cross-sectional correlations in the residual returns, a point argued 
by Fama (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Brav (2000).  The concern is that long holding 
periods, by design, lead to overlapping time periods in the observations and may lead to cross-sectional 
correlation in the abnormal returns if the underlying return model is mis-specified.  While this is 
fundamentally a problem of not understanding the true return generating function, the concern that 
significance may be overstated is a valid point given our four-year holding periods and the thousands of 
cases we consider. 
While our concern is primarily a lack of significance in a portion of our sample, we nevertheless 
accommodate this by reporting return evidence using a calendar-time approach.  The Appendix provides 
a more careful description of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  Here, hundreds of return 
observations at a single point in time are boiled down to a single observation.  Briefly, this approach not 
only provides a different method for estimating abnormal return performance with perhaps more 
appealing significance properties, but also allows us to easily control for other first-order effects such as 
momentum as well as the size and book-to-market effects we controlled for earlier.15  Perhaps more 
importantly, recent papers in the accounting and finance literatures have identified discretionary accruals 
as a priced factor in the cross-section (Xie (2001) and Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2004)).  
To exclude the possibility that the comparatively low post-announcement return performance of poor 
earnings quality buyback firms is simply the manifestation of a more general effect, we amend the 
Carhart model and add discretionary accruals as an additional factor.16   
Table 7 reports the results for calendar-time portfolios formed assuming both equal- and log- 
value-weighted methods.  Point estimates for the intercepts are positive for each DA quintile 1 to 4 under 
both investment strategies and the intercepts are significant at conventional levels.  For High DA firms 
in quintile 5, the intercepts are not significant as the point estimates are close to zero (0.07% and 0.10% 
respectively for the equal- and the log-value-weighted approaches).  We also report evidence for a 
self-financing, arbitrage portfolio labeled in the row “Low – High.”  This portfolio assumes long 
positions in the lowest DA quintile and short positions in the highest DA quintile.  The intercepts are 
significant at conventional levels and indicate that returns in the highest DA quintile are indeed 
comparatively low.   
As before, we consider the manipulation story more carefully by subdividing the poor earnings 
quality quintile by the abnormal return in the quarter preceding the buyback announcement.  Given this 
return-based sorting method, the momentum control provided through the calendar-time approach has 
                                                 
15 Numerous studies adopt this approach.  Two recent examples include Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2004) and 
Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique (2004). 
16 Although not reported here, we also applied the simple Carhart model without controlling for discretionary 
accrual effects.  The findings are similar to those reported in Table 7. 
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some appeal.  Yet consistent with the findings to this point, we do not find evidence of a positive drift in 
firms where managers conceivably were under greater pressure to buy back stock.  Firms classified as 
High-H have positive and significant intercepts, while those ranked as High-L do not.    
The results suggest that the documented long-term return evidence is not likely to be primarily the 
consequence of a bad model problem.  Firms with aggressive reporting practices do not show the same 
long-horizon abnormal performance more generally observed in buyback companies.  This result holds 
even when we control for the findings that firms with high discretionary accruals generally report lower 
long-run returns in the cross-section.17 
5.2 Undervaluation, free cash flow, leverage and dilution from employee stock options 
Next, we consider whether these results somehow reconcile with other commonly mentioned reasons 
for why firms buy back stock.  Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004) recently show that among several 
plausible motivations for share repurchases, undervaluation appears to be a primary one.  Clearly, the 
comparatively lower post-announcement return and operating performance for firms in the highest DA 
quintile is not consistent with the undervaluation hypothesis.  Moreover, given that prices are falling 
prior to the buyback announcement in the High DA cases, if executives were convinced their shares were 
undervalued, one might expect a decrease in the rate of executive option exercise activity.  Evidence in 
Table 3 suggests just the opposite; High DA firms demonstrate high option exercise activity.  
Yet corporate finance theory also suggests that firms may use buybacks to disgorge cash and reduce 
free cash flow or to adjust capital structure.  We investigate this in Table 8 by reporting 
industry-median-adjusted abnormal cash relative to total assets and leverage ratio for each discretionary 
accrual group.  When considering the first hypothesis, obtaining a careful handle on “slack” resources in 
a given firm is not straightforward.  Rather than use a flow measure of free cash flow that might be 
subject to measurement problems driven by the choice of accrual level, we use a stock measure defined as 
cash plus short-term investments (Compustat item 1) over total assets.  This same measure was recently 
used by Grullon and Michaely (2004) to examine the free cash flow hypothesis.18  We apply an 
                                                 
17 In unreported work, we also consider a variety of other robustness checks.  To further address the overlapping 
nature of our data, we considered evidence which excludes follow-up buyback announcements within the four-year 
horizon we apply in Table 7.  Here, the sample is roughly cut in half.  Both the BHAR and the five-factor model 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 7.  We also investigated whether our findings were 
sensitive to our estimate of discretionary accruals. We follow the same method of Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 
(2005).  They design a performance-matched discretionary accrual measure by subtracting a matching firm’s DA 
from that of a given sample firm where the matching firm is selected to have a similar return on assets (ROA) and is 
from the same industry.  Here as well, the long-run stock evidence is generally similar to what we report here. 
18 For example, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) use a flow measure defined as EBITDA - income tax + changes in 
deferred tax - interest expenses - dividends for preferred stocks - dividends for common stocks.  The downside to 
such an approach is that this particular measure is directly affected by accruals.  Given our context, this measure, 
by definition, is not an appealing way to examine the free cash flow hypothesis.  Nevertheless, as a robustness 
check, we did use this flow-based measure; qualitatively, the results do not change. 
 19
industry-median adjustment by subtracting the median level of cash plus short-term investments over total 
assets of each firm’s respective industry.   
We see in Table 8 that before the buyback announcement, abnormal cash for each DA quintile is 
significantly above that of their industry peers, a result consistent with conventional economic theory.  
This is particularly true for firms in the lowest DA group where cash is highest, 9.05% of total assets 
above the industry norm.  Even for firms in the highest DA group, cash is 3.37% of total assets above the 
industry norm albeit it is significantly less than that of low DA firms. 
Nevertheless, given what are still significantly positive levels of cash balances in High DA firms, it 
may be the case that managers in these high accrual firms may have been motivated to announce a 
buyback in order to reduce these excess cash balances.  Yet, when we focus on the change in this 
measure from the year before to the year after the announcement, we reject this hypothesis.  While we 
generally see significant decreases in cash for most DA quintiles, the change in the point estimate for 
High DA firms  is close to zero and the result is not significant.  The fact that cash balances did not 
decline much is also consistent with the reduced level of actual buyback activity documented in Table 6 
for High DA firms.19   
A second primary reason firms repurchase stock is to alter capital structure by increasing leverage.  
In a similar fashion, we report industry-adjusted leverage ratios defined as the ratio of total debt (total 
current liabilities plus total long-term debt, Compustat item 5 plus item 9) to total assets.  Here, we also 
find evidence consistent with economic theory for most DA quintiles.  Industry-adjusted leverage ratios 
are in general less than the industry norm except for Low DA firms.  Even for High DA firms, leverage 
ratios are significantly below their industry medians.  This is consistent with the possibility that 
managers in High DA firms might be considering altering capital structure through a buyback.  However, 
when we focus on changes in leverage ratios between year -1 and year 1, we do not find any significant 
increase in leverage for High DA firms.   
It has been argued (particularly in the popular press) that stock repurchases are affected by 
compensation plans.  Jolls (1998), Fenn and Liang (2001) and Weisbenner (2000) point out that firms 
have incentives to buy back shares to avoid dilution when employee stock options are exercised.  This 
motivation has seemingly grown in importance in recent years as incentive stock options plans assumed 
an increasing component of compensation in the 1990s.  The evidence in Tables 1 through 4 provides 
some insight as to whether stock options may be a factor in High DA cases.  The stock returns of High 
                                                 
19 When we focus more narrowly on High-L and High-H firms, High-L firms actually show decrease in cash 
(-0.76% with t-statistics of -1.63) whereas High-H firms display some increase in cash (0.53% with t-statistics of 
1.31).  However, this decrease in cash for High-L appears to be caused not by an intentional decision to disgorge 
cash, but instead (given the results in Table 5 and 6) appears to be driven by a significant drop in operating 
performance during the year one. 
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DA firms during year -1 are very poor.  The average raw return was -11.5% and even more dramatic 
-21.9% for High-L firms.  As such, outstanding employee options in these firms are becoming less 
in-the-money.  Stated differently, managers in High DA firms would seemingly have less reason to 
worry about dilution from a flurry of option exercises in the near future when performance is so poor.  
One might argue though that due to negative returns, managers might have thought that it would be a 
“good time” to buy back shares for the purpose of preventing future dilution.  This, however, assumes 
that managers think their shares are undervalued or have foresight that a rebound in performance is 
pending.  Of course, none of this is supported by the long-run performance evidence of low earnings 
quality firms.  In addition, the actual buyback activity of High DA firms presented earlier also shows 
that they tend to buy back significantly fewer shares than others.20 
In sum, firms buy back stock for a variety of reasons that are well supported in the economic 
literature. In this study, we have focused attention on High DA firms arguing that this may proxy for a 
sub-set of managers who may be under pressure to lift share prices and, thus, may be using a buyback 
announcement as a low-cost method to mislead investors.  Clearly, our proxy is noisy and while one 
cannot completely rule out that managers in High DA firms might also be responding at the margin to 
some conventional economic motivation such as leverage or dilution, by the same token it is also hard to 
rule out the manipulation hypothesis.  To this point, our robustness checks have been univariate in nature.  
As a final check in the next section, we consider these factors together in a multivariate framework.  
5.3 Regression analysis 
In this section, we return back to the abnormal stock return evidence and make one last check to see 
if the relatively lower return performance of High DA firms can somehow be explained by some factor 
other than the manipulation hypothesis.  To do this, we consider a multivariate environment similar to 
that reported in Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004).  They evaluate long-run abnormal stock returns in the 
context of the free cash flow, leverage, and undervaluation hypotheses.  According to the manipulation 
story, the performance of repurchasing firms with low earnings quality is likely to be lower compared to 
other firms unless some other value-enhancing, economic factor is present.  While we did observe this in 
a univariate setting, we now re-examine this in a multivariate framework by regressing long-run abnormal 
                                                 
20 One can contend that the results in Table 3 are inconsistent with the argument described here.  However, there 
are two points that make the above argument more compelling.  First, the results in Table 3 show that high DA 
firms’ executives exercise their options more than other firms during year -1 but not during year +1.  In addition, 
the amount of unexercised vested option held by executives in high DA firms is not significantly greater than other 
firms during year +1.  This indicates that high DA firms are not more concerned about the future dilution from 
executive option exercises at the buyback announcement compared to others.  Second, the amount of executive 
options is only about one-third of that of total employee stock options (based on the numbers in Kahle (2002)).  
Therefore, the argument purely based on the executive stock options is missing the main point behind the dilution 
story.  Considering the difficulties of getting employee stock option data, the argument based on the moneyness 
seems to be more compelling. 
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four-year returns (at the firm level) on DA quintile values or a dummy for the highest DA quintile (or a 
dummy for High-L firms) along with other independent variables, market capitalization, B/M ratio, cash, 
leverage, the size of the repurchase program, the prior one-year abnormal return and the actual buyback 
amount.   
We see in Table 9 that for models one through four, the coefficient on DA quintile is significantly 
negatively correlated with the long-run abnormal returns, even after controlling for various factors.  The 
same is also true if we use a simple dummy denoting firms in the highest DA quintile.  In model seven, 
these other factors do not explain away the poor performance of firms reporting both high accruals and 
poor pre-announcement returns (i.e., High-L firms), the cases where concern over possible manipulation 
is highest.  Similar to the results reported in Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004), long-run abnormal stock 
returns are significantly positively related to firm size, the percentage of shares announced to repurchase, 
and actual buyback amounts.21  The findings with respect to leverage are also consistent with their work.  
While buyback firms generally have low leverage, firms with low leverage do not show higher long-run 
returns, a result inconsistent with the leverage story.   
Regarding the impact of actual buyback activity, the coefficient on this variable in models one and 
two suggests that significantly higher long-run performance is associated with actual buybacks.  In 
models three through six where we interact actual buyback activity with a High DA dummy, we see 
marginally significant positive effects; the positive effect of actual buyback activity is significantly 
greater for high DA firms, and the coefficients of High DA dummy remain significantly negative.  When 
we substitute the High-L dummy for the High DA dummy in model seven, we see similar results; we 
observe high significance for the High-L dummy and for the interactive variable with actual buyback 
activity.  Given that our sort on DA is a noisy metric of managerial intentions to mislead, this finding is 
seemingly consistent with the manipulation story; High DA firms, especially High-L firms, where 
managers announce a program but do not follow through with actual purchase show poorer long-run 
performance.  Managers who are under pressure to repurchase stock due to a slump in performance, 
even after using accounting conventions to support earnings, cannot benefit shareholders in the long-run 
simply by announcing a buyback program without intending to actually buy stock.  
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
Previous academic studies have theorized and empirically examined a number of economic factors 
                                                 
21 Due to how the free cash flow hypothesis is examined, the results here differ from that reported in Chan, 
Ikenberry and Lee (2004).  If instead we use their definition of free cash flow based on Lehn and Poulsen (1989), 
free cash flow becomes a significant variable in the regression.  Yet even with this alternative definition of free 
cash flow, our conclusions do not change; the significance of DA and DA-related variables remains significant. 
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as to why firms repurchase stock.  These include responding to undervaluation, disgorgement of free 
cash flows, serving as a dividend substitute, altering capital structure, providing a defense against a 
hostile takeover and prevention of dilution related to employee stock options.  On the other hand, 
surveys of executives also seem to indicate that “price support” is an important reason why firms use 
share repurchases.  Further, some academic studies suggest that share repurchases, particularly those on 
the open market, may not be good signaling devices as they may afford managers a cheap way to mimic a 
signal if the costs for falsely announcing a buyback are low.  The market, on average, reacts positively to 
the announcement of open market share repurchases yet, by design, these programs are not binding and 
are structured for flexibility.  As such, these programs afford managers the ability to authorize a buyback 
even though there is no intention to buy back stock, thus creating the potential for cheap talk (e.g., 
Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2004)) and the possibility that some announcements are used in a manipulative 
manner. 
While several studies report evidence consistent with key economic motives such as undervaluation, 
this paper considers whether manipulation of investor expectations may be a primary factor in a sub-set of 
repurchase announcements where managers may be under pressure to otherwise support stock prices.  
We do this by focusing on firms with low earnings quality.  Previous studies document that managers 
appear to be using accruals, especially discretionary accruals (DAs), to increase reported earnings in an 
attempt to manipulate stock prices.  To the extent that these attempts to manage earnings are not 
successful, managers may need to turn to other devices to boost stock prices.  In such a case, open 
market share repurchase programs may serve as an inexpensive means to send a false signal to the market 
to manipulate expectations. 
Using 7,725 programs announced between 1980 and 2000, we find that manipulation may explain 
why some firms with low earnings quality announce a buyback, especially those with poor prior stock 
returns.  We find that management in high DA firms seem to have strong motive to falsely signal.  Not 
only are these executives making discretionary accounting decisions to support their earnings, but 
information in the market place is also generally negative prior to a buyback announcement.  Although 
earnings are not falling per se, sales, cash flows adjusted for accruals and returns are suffering.  Analysts 
are revising their earnings downward and the market reaction to quarterly earnings announcements is 
negative in high DA firms prior to a buyback announcement.   
As Sloan (1996) argues, investors may fixate on accounting earnings without paying much attention 
to the quality of the accounting numbers.  Consistent with this and other studies about investor 
recognition of accruals, we find that initially the market does not seem to pay attention to earnings quality 
when buyback programs are first announced. The significantly positive announcement period abnormal 
return indicates that the market initially welcomes the share repurchase decision made even by those 
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firms with poor earnings quality.  However, the long-term stock return and operating performance 
suggest that the firms with poor earnings quality behave differently from the general case.   
Consistent with previous studies, we observe positive long-term abnormal performance for those 
repurchasing firms with high earnings quality.  Yet, the stock returns of firms with low earnings quality 
do not outperform in the long-run.  The operating performance of these firms shows clear evidence of 
deterioration after the announcement.  When low earnings quality firms are sub-divided into two groups 
based on the prior quarterly abnormal stock returns, poor performance (generally speaking) is more 
profound in firms seemingly under greater pressure to manipulate investor perception.   
The results are consistent with the notion that in contrast to many of the traditional economic 
motives in the literature, manipulation may be an important factor motivating managers in some cases.  
Bad model problems do not seem to explain these results nor, on more careful examination, do previously 
documented popular motivations explain the results we find for low earnings quality firms.   
The evidence, at least for firms that use aggressive accounting practices, suggests that managers 
when announcing these buybacks may have been motivated to mislead investors.  While one cannot rule 
out hubris as a possible motive, this too would not seem to hold.  Clearly prices are falling and managers 
might defensively be buying back stock if hubris were an important factor.  On the other hand, their 
behavior is generally not so consistent with this story.  For example, we find greater option exercise 
activity in these firms prior to the repurchase announcement and actual buyback activity in the first 
year of the program is lower than otherwise expected if hubris was an important factor in these cases.       
One might wonder that if some repurchases are manipulative in intent, why it is that the market does 
not penalize these stocks.  While low earnings quality firms do not show positive abnormal long-run 
return performance (a result which is in contrast to the more general case), by the same token these firms 
do not show evidence of a negative drift.  However, the magnitude of the initial announcement for all 
firms (including high DA firms) is small, roughly 2%.  Even when corrected later, a price change of this 
magnitude is difficult to distinguish when estimating abnormal long-term stock returns.   
Moreover, the fact that some firms may be misleading the market through these programs may 
provide some insight into why, more generally, we see investors react with skepticism to buyback 
announcements.  If investors cannot, ex-ante, sort through this potentially mis-leading behavior, this 
might provide some rationale as to why underreaction is often observed in empirical studies of corporate 
transactions. In the general case, the market seems to slowly correct this underreaction as better 
information arrives over time, resulting in positive information shocks and long-term abnormal return 
performance.  Yet for low earnings quality firms, managers do not seem to make buyback 
announcements in advance of any follow-up good news.  To the extent that these stocks are fairly valued 
at the time of the buyback announcement, one should not anticipate a negative return drift.   
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Clearly, while previous studies provide strong evidence in support of many of the traditional 
economic stories used to motivate share repurchases, this paper finds some evidence that at least some 
open market buyback programs may be intended to manipulate investor opinion.  
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Appendix 
1.1 Event-time, buy-and-hold abnormal returns  
We focus much of our evaluation on buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  While a conventional 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) approach is straightforward to estimate, it implicitly assumes frequent 
rebalancing and thus implies high transaction costs.  Further, while we eliminate sample firms whose 
price is below $3 per share, frequent rebalancing does induce an upward return bias due to bid-ask bounce 
(Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Conard and Kaul (1993)). 
We calculate annual BHRs for each firm in our sample for the year before and the four years 
following the repurchase announcement, where each year is defined as 252 trading days.  For each event 
year, portfolio returns are computed based on BHRs of sample firms, assuming an equal-weighted 
investment strategy.  Longer horizon portfolio returns are obtained by compounding annual portfolio 
returns across event times.  This implicitly assumes annual rebalancing and reduces the possibility of 
any one firm dominating the portfolio in later years.  
We follow Lee (1997) and Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004) to estimate abnormal return performance 
using five matching firms.  These control firms are formed on the basis of market-cap and 
book-to-market ratio (B/M), two important factors that explain cross-sectional stock returns (e.g., Fama 
and French (1992, 1993, and 1996) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)).  To identify matching 
firms for a given repurchase firm, among firms that are in the same size decile as the repurchasing firm, 
we choose five firms with the closest B/M ratios.  The abnormal return is obtained by subtracting the 
matching firm portfolio return from the repurchasing portfolio return. 
For statistical inferencing, we employ bootstrapping to get empirical p-values as recommended by 
Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999).  Specifically, we randomly replace each sample firm with another firm 
with the same size and B/M group at the time of the repurchase announcement, and thus form a “pseudo” 
portfolio.  We calculate BHRs and then abnormal BHRs for this particular portfolio as if it is our sample 
portfolio.  We repeat this process for 1,000 times to form an empirical distribution of abnormal returns.  
The statistical significance of the sample portfolio abnormal performance is measured by the empirical 
p-value, the fraction of the distribution of pseudo abnormal returns that are greater than that of the 
original sample abnormal return. 
1.2 Calendar-time abnormal returns derived from factor models 
In each month during our sample period, we form a portfolio of repurchase firms that have 
announced share repurchases over the past four-year period and then compute the portfolio return.   
We reform the portfolio every month.  As a result, a time series of portfolio returns is available to 
run the four-factor model (Carhart (1997)) regressions as follows: 
titttftmtftp ewWMLhHMLsSMBRRRR ++++−+=− )( ,,,, βα   (A1) 
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where Rp is the sample firm portfolio return, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm is the market portfolio return, SMB 
is the small-firm portfolio return minus big-firm portfolio return, HML is the high book-to-market 
portfolio return minus low book-to-market portfolio return, and WML is the winner portfolio return minus 
loser portfolio return.  SMB and HML are used to control size and book-to-market effects, respectively.  
WML is added to incorporate the momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  The 
abnormal returns of repurchase firms can be tested based on the t-value of the regression intercept. 
Previous studies argue that the abnormal performance (if any) of corporate events occurs in small 
stocks only (Fama (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000)).  
Therefore, for robustness checks, we perform the calendar-time portfolio approach by both equally- and 
log-value-weighting the repurchase sample.  
One of our objectives is to examine the relationship between long-run performance of repurchase 
firms and their earnings quality (proxied by DA quintile ranking).  However, any relationship we find 
could be the manifestation of the DA effect documented in earlier studies.  For example, Xie (2001) and 
Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2004) show that DA is reliably negatively related to future stock 
returns, and the return predictability of accruals found in Sloan (1996) mainly comes from the 
discretionary component of accruals.  
To control for this DA effect in non-repurchase firms, we modify the factor model regressions by 
adding an earnings quality factor into the Carhart four-factor model as shown in equation (A2): 
ttitttftmtftp egGMBwWMLhHMLsSMBRRRR +++++−+=− )( ,,,, βα   (A2) 
where GMB is the return to the good earnings quality portfolio return minus that of the bad earnings 
quality portfolio return and the others are defined the same as those in equation (A1).  The earnings 
quality factor is constructed as follows.  We first search all firms, covered in both CRSP and Compustat, 
with available accounting accruals.  We run Jones (1991) regressions (based on equation (2)) in order to 
estimate their DA (based on equation (3)).  At the end of June of year t, we sort all these firms into DA 
quintiles based on the DAs of the fiscal year ending in year t-1, and keep track of their next 12 month 
returns.  The earnings quality factor is the median return of the lowest DA quintile (good quality) 
portfolio minus the median return of the highest DA quintile (bad quality) portfolio.  
To apply this five-factor model, in each month, we form a portfolio that is composed of firms that 
have announced share repurchases within the past four-year period.  We start the portfolio formation 
from 1983 and stop in 2000 even though our sample period starts from 1980.  This is to make sure that 
the portfolio used in the regression analysis is seasoned.  We exclude the calendar month with less than 
sixty firms in the portfolio.  We check the sensitivity of the results using different exclusion criteria but 
the results were qualitatively similar.  The portfolio returns are calculated using both equal-weights and 
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log value-weights to check the sensitivity of the results. We use log value-weights, rather than 
value-weights, to reduce dominating effects of extremely large firms as indicated in Ikenberry and 
Ramnath (2002). 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of 7,725 open-market share repurchases during 1980 and 2000, except the 
fourth quarter of 1987. Each sample firm is required to have accounting accruals at least four months prior to the 
repurchase announcement. N is the number of announcements. 5-day AR is the repurchase announcement return 
measured over the 5-day window (-2, 2) minus the corresponding CRSP value-weighted index return. REP-1 and 
MAT-1 are average raw returns over the one-year period prior to the announcement of share repurchases for 
repurchasing firms and size-and-BM matched control firms, respectively. AR-1 is the difference between REP-1 and 
MAT-1. % shares announced is the percentage of shares announced to buy back relative to total outstanding shares. 
Accruals are defined as changes in non-cash current assets, minus changes in current liabilities excluding short-term 
debt and taxes payable, and minus depreciation. DA is the discretionary accruals based on Jones (1991), which is the 
residual of the following regression. 
i
i
i
i
i
ii
i
TA
PPEa
TA
Salesa
TA
a
TA
Accruals ε++∆+= 210 1 . 
Size quintile (1 is the smallest) is based on the market value of equity of repurchase firm at the month-end prior to 
the announcement relative to all NYSE firms. BM quintile (1 is the smallest) is based on the ratio of the book value 
to the market value of equity. DA quintile (1 is the smallest) is the DA quintile ranking relative to all stock universe. 
Panel A reports summary statistics sorted by years, while Panel B reports results based on DA quintiles. The rows of 
“Low-High” test the differences between the top and bottom DA quintiles. Numbers in the parentheses are 
t-statistics. High-L (High-H) represents the highest DA quintile with prior one-quarter abnormal return that is below 
(above) the average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest DA quintile firms. 
 
Panel A: By year 
Year N 5-day AR REP -1 MAT -1 AR-1 % shares DA Size  quintile 
B/M  
quintile 
DA  
quintile 
1980-1990 1739 2.23%  4.12% 11.13% -7.01% 7.94%  0.0033 3.40  2.80  3.03  
1991-2000 5986 1.67%  1.13% 15.33% -14.19% 7.31%  -0.0036 2.81  2.79  3.04  
All 7725 1.79%  1.80% 14.38% -12.58% 7.45%  -0.0020 2.95  2.80  3.04  
Panel B: By discretionary accruals quintile ranking 
DA quintile N 5-day AR REP -1 MAT -1 AR -1 % shares DA Size  quintile 
B/M  
quintile 
Low 1032 2.35%  7.19%  17.52% -10.33% 7.59%  -0.1702  2.63  2.73  
2 1798 1.74%  7.79%  17.76% -9.97% 7.37%  -0.0391  3.07  2.66  
3 1936 1.46%  3.14%  14.84% -11.71% 7.25%  0.0000  3.33  2.79  
4 1751 1.70%  0.17%  11.57% -11.39% 7.35%  0.0371  2.96  2.90  
High 1208 2.06%  -11.49% 10.01% -21.50% 7.88%  0.1369  2.41  2.92  
 0.30% 18.68% 7.51% 11.17% -0.29% -0.3071 0.23 -0.19 Low - High 
 (0.69) (9.48) (3.80) (4.64) (-0.85) (-11.44) (4.00) (-3.44) 
High-L 600 2.29%  -21.91% 18.27% -40.19% 7.47%  0.1368  2.35  2.69  
High-H 608 1.83%  -1.20% 1.85% -3.05% 8.29%  0.1370  2.46  3.15  
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Table 2 
Quarterly Earnings Announcement Returns and Analysts’ Forecast Revisions 
 
This table presents the quarterly earnings announcement returns (in %) and analysts’ forecast revisions (in %) prior 
to repurchase announcement for the bottom and top DA quintiles. Panel A reports the earnings announcement return 
defined as the buy-and-hold return compounded from day -2 to +2 relative to the quarterly earnings announcement 
date minus the CRSP value-weight index return over the same interval.  Extreme abnormal return observations 
above 20% or below –20% are eliminated. Quarter -1 represents the quarter with earnings announcement date right 
before the repurchase announcement. Numbers in Panel A are mean returns, and numbers in brackets are median 
returns, and the number in the third row of each cell is the number of observations. Panel B reports proportions of 
firms with negative abnormal forecast revisions. Forecast revision at quarter -1 indicates the result for monthly 
forecast revisions during the 3 months right before repurchase announcements. The abnormal forecast revision 
equals the forecast revision minus the expected forecast revision, where the expected forecast revision equals the 
average change in analysts’ earnings forecasts during all months available at the IBES data but excluding the months 
-6 to 6 around the month end of the calculation. The rows of “Low-High” show the differences between the top and 
bottom DA quintiles. ***, **, and * indicate the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. High-L 
(High-H) represents the highest DA quintile with prior one-quarter abnormal return that is below (above) the 
average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest DA quintile firms.  All numbers in Panel B are based on 
analysts’ average EPS forecast revisions, and numbers in brackets are based on median forecast revisions. 
 
Event Quarters DA quintiles -4 -3 -2 -1 
Panel A: Earnings announcement return 
Low 
0.628*** 
[ 0.444***] 
880 
0.338 
[ 0.258] 
895 
0.020 
[ - 0.147] 
899 
- 0.113 
[- 0.166] 
904 
High 
0.302 
[- 0.124] 
1023 
0.172 
[- 0.024] 
1045 
0.021 
[- 0.162] 
1055 
- 0.993*** 
[- 0.996***] 
1049 
Low - High 0.326 [ 0.568 ] 
0.166 
[ 0.282 ] 
-0.001 
[ 0.016 ] 
0.879*** 
[ 0.830***] 
High-L 
0.361 
[- 0.063] 
480 
0.252 
[ 0.255 ] 
485 
- 0.420 
[- 0.396 ] 
480 
-2.352*** 
[-2.182***] 
475 
High- H 
0.250 
[- 0.278] 
543 
0.102 
[- 0.297 ] 
560 
0.390 
[ 0.034 ] 
575 
0.132 
[ 0.034 ] 
574 
Panel B: Proportion of negative abnormal forecast revisions 
Low 50.91 [ 48.7 ] 
49.05 
[ 48.29 ] 
51.88 
[ 51.01 ] 
54.59 
[ 55.46 ] 
High 53.23 [ 51.96 ] 
50.50 
[ 50.83 ] 
56.56 
[ 55.91 ] 
60.08 
[ 59.56 ] 
Low - High -2.32 [ -3.27 ] 
-1.45 
[-2.54 ] 
-4.67** 
[-4.91***] 
-5.49*** 
[-4.10*] 
High-L 51.41 [ 50.47 ] 
48.21 
[49.10 ] 
51.52 
[50.43 ] 
60.04 
[ 60.25 ] 
High- H 55.00 [ 53.41 ] 
52.76 
[52.54 ] 
61.49 
[61.28 ] 
60.13 
[58.86 ] 
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Table 3  
Stock Options of Top-Executives 
 
This table presents the stock options held by CEOs and top-five executives. Two measures are applied. Panel A 
presents the stock options exercised divided by total shares outstanding, and panel B shows the unexercised vested 
options divided by total shares outstanding. Year -1 (Year 1) is the calendar year before (of) the year of repurchase 
announcement. Each measure is with 0.5% winsorization for top-bottom observations. The rows of “Low-High” test 
the differences between the top and bottom DA quintiles. High-L (High-H) represents the highest DA quintile with 
prior one-quarter abnormal return that is below (above) the average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest 
DA quintile firms.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics and numbers in italics are the numbers of observations. 
 
Stock options exercised to  
shares outstanding 
Unexercised vested options to  
share outstanding 
 For CEOs 
 For top-five 
executives  For CEOs 
 For top-five 
executives 
DA quintiles 
Year-1 Year1 Year-1 Year1 Year-1 Year1 Year-1 Year1 
0.081% 0.078% 0.241% 0.238% 0.528% 0.609% 1.255% 1.370% 
All 
2007 2298 2789 3021 2007 2298 2789 3021 
0.093% 0.065% 0.256% 0.246% 0.451% 0.591% 1.327% 1.522% 
Low 
235 279 332 366 235 279 332 366 
0.056% 0.072% 0.233% 0.244% 0.476% 0.563% 1.218% 1.320% 
2 
514 584 689 754 514 584 689 754 
0.057% 0.058% 0.183% 0.186% 0.450% 0.540% 1.081% 1.209% 
3 
599 675 831 883 599 675 831 883 
0.094% 0.113% 0.258% 0.270% 0.644% 0.702% 1.315% 1.409% 
4 
460 521 655 701 460 521 655 701 
0.172% 0.085% 0.374% 0.292% 0.721% 0.731% 1.633% 1.679% 
High 
199 239 282 317 199 239 282 317 
-0.079% -0.020% -0.118% -0.046% -0.270% -0.140% -0.306% -0.157% 
Low - High 
(-1.74) (-0.94) (-2.28) (-1.13) (-2.65) (-1.45) (-2.17) (-1.17) 
0.286% 0.108% 0.479% 0.322% 0.636% 0.683% 1.616% 1.742% 
High-L 
99 114 141 155 99 114 141 155 
0.090% 0.064% 0.289% 0.264% 0.819% 0.775% 1.650% 1.618% 
High-H 
100 125 141 162 100 125 141 162 
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Table 4  
Long-run Buy-and-hold Returns 
 
This table presents long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns (in %). Panel A presents the results over the full sample period (1980-2000), and panel B shows the 
results for two sub-periods (1980-1990 and 1991-2000).  Annual buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) for individual firms are first calculated by compounding the 
daily returns of each repurchase firm for 252 days, or up to the delisting date (whichever is earlier).  For each event year, portfolio returns are computed based 
on BHRs of sample firms, assuming an equal-weighted investment strategy.  Long-run returns (except event year –1) are then obtained by compounding the 
annual portfolio returns over time, starting from year 1. N is the number of firms in each category.  REP refers to the repurchasing firms and MAT refers to the 
size/BM matching firms.  AR represents the abnormal buy-and-hold return, the difference between BHRs of repurchasing and corresponding matching firms. 
Based on the empirical distribution via bootstrapping, the p-value is presented following the abnormal return.  In Panel A, High-L (High-H) represents the 
highest DA quintile with prior one-quarter abnormal return that is below (above) the average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest DA quintile firms. 
 
DA Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
rank N REP MAT AR p N REP MAT AR p N REP MAT AR p N REP MAT AR p N REP MAT AR p 
Panel A: Full period 
All 7725 1.80 14.38 -12.58 1.000 7725 22.43 17.77 4.66 0.000 7468 41.97 34.43 7.55 0.000 6989 64.00 53.07 10.93 0.000 6521 89.33 73.72 15.61 0.000
       
Low 1032 7.19 17.52 -10.33 0.993 1032 27.12 18.86 8.25 0.000 1003 47.68 33.47 14.21 0.000 924 76.82 52.72 24.10 0.000 842 105.94 69.03 36.91 0.000
2 1798 7.79 17.76 -9.97 1.000 1798 23.38 17.15 6.23 0.000 1736 44.37 34.24 10.13 0.000 1632 64.08 52.00 12.08 0.000 1531 93.76 73.57 20.19 0.000
3 1936 3.14 14.84 -11.71 1.000 1936 21.03 17.50 3.53 0.000 1884 39.88 34.29 5.59 0.000 1787 61.31 51.94 9.37 0.011 1684 85.95 74.14 11.82 0.017
4 1751 0.17 11.57 -11.39 1.000 1751 21.33 18.29 3.04 0.015 1679 42.60 35.18 7.42 0.000 1560 63.41 55.40 8.01 0.000 1470 83.34 75.00 8.34 0.000
High 1208 -11.49 10.01 -21.50 1.000 1208 20.87 17.45 3.42 0.063 1166 36.07 34.65 1.42 0.119 1086 58.34 53.43 4.91 0.103 994 83.00 75.25 7.75 0.116
High-L 600 -21.91 18.27 -40.19 1.000 600 16.92 18.26 -1.34 0.528 578 29.07 36.64 -7.58 0.492 539 47.06 55.13 -8.07 0.493 487 70.84 76.63 -5.79 0.509
High-H 608 -1.20 1.85 -3.05 0.950 608 24.77 16.66 8.12 0.008 588 43.13 32.69 10.44 0.017 547 69.99 51.76 18.22 0.020 507 95.48 73.86 21.62 0.044
Panel B: 1980-1990 
All 1739 4.12 11.13 -7.01 1.000 1739 23.23 17.06 6.17 0.000 1704 41.66 35.97 5.69 0.007 1651 69.32 60.66 8.66 0.009 1594 90.77 79.90 10.87 0.007
                          
Low 212  10.75 12.86 -2.12 0.366 212 21.41 18.14 3.27 0.178 210 34.52 32.35 2.17 0.288 204 71.14 57.30 13.84 0.075 201 94.01 71.29 22.72 0.048
2 434  6.78 13.04 -6.26 1.000 434 24.14 17.81 6.33 0.007 425 45.51 36.40 9.10 0.008 413 71.23 59.99 11.24 0.030 389 97.21 81.38 15.83 0.007
3 444  5.90 11.33 -5.43 0.991 444 24.56 16.07 8.49 0.008 438 43.15 34.44 8.70 0.025 425 72.79 60.05 12.74 0.016 411 91.55 81.21 10.33 0.055
4 395  2.90 10.02 -7.12 0.991 395 21.79 15.67 6.12 0.010 387 42.36 36.55 5.80 0.002 374 70.16 61.33 8.83 0.019 363 86.95 78.38 8.57 0.080
High 254  -7.20 7.80 -15.00 1.000 254 23.13 18.79 4.34 0.026 244 37.38 40.02 -2.64 0.244 235 56.59 64.57 -7.98 0.544 230 80.81 84.80 -3.99 0.403
Panel C: 1991-2000 
All 5986 1.13 15.33 -14.19 1.000 5986 22.20 17.98 4.22 0.000 5764 42.07 33.96 8.10 0.000 5338 62.35 50.76 11.59 0.000 4927 88.88 71.84 17.04 0.000
                       
Low 820  6.27 18.72 -12.45 1.000 820 28.59 19.05 9.54 0.000 793 51.23 33.76 17.47 0.000 720 77.86 51.38 26.48 0.002 641 108.88 68.39 40.49 0.000
2 1364 8.11 19.27 -11.15 1.000 1364 23.14 16.95 6.20 0.008 1311 44.01 33.54 10.46 0.000 1219 61.71 49.38 12.33 0.000 1142 92.57 71.00 21.57 0.000
3 1492 2.31 15.89 -13.57 1.000 1492 19.97 17.92 2.05 0.010 1446 38.90 34.23 4.67 0.009 1362 57.85 49.40 8.45 0.015 1273 84.22 71.89 12.33 0.016
4 1356 -0.62 12.02 -12.64 1.000 1356 21.19 19.05 2.14 0.029 1292 42.67 34.71 7.96 0.000 1186 61.27 53.50 7.77 0.000 1107 82.18 73.89 8.29 0.014
High 954  -12.63 10.60 -23.23 1.000 954 20.27 17.09 3.18 0.130 922 35.71 33.23 2.47 0.146 851 58.82 50.51 8.31 0.106 764 83.60 72.78 10.82 0.132
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Table 5 
Operating Performance 
 
This table presents the median operating performance (in %) around repurchase announcements for the top and 
bottom DA quintiles.  The operating performance is measured by return-on-assets (ROAs) defined as operating 
income before depreciation divided by average total assets.  Year 1 represents the fiscal year of the repurchase 
announcement.  Panel A shows raw ROAs without any adjustment.  Panel B presents abnormal ROAs obtained by 
subtracting matching firm’s ROAs from repurchase firm’s ROAs.  In the same 2-digit SIC-code industry as of 
repurchase sample firm, we select the matching firm whose pre-event ROA is within 80% to 120% or ±0.01 of the 
sample firm’s pre-event ROA.  If more than one firm satisfies the condition, we choose the firm with closest 
pre-event ROA as of the sample firm. On the other hand, if no matching firm is found, we then search 1-digit 
SIC-code industry.  If there is still no firm which meets the criterion, we search all possible firms with similar 
pre-event ROA. Panel C shows the cumulative changes in ROAs, which cumulates the changes in abnormal ROAs 
starting from year 1.  The rows of “Low-High” test the differences between the top and bottom DA quintiles. 
High-L (High-H) represents the highest DA quintile with prior one-quarter abnormal return that is below (above) the 
average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest DA quintile firms.  Numbers in parentheses are p-values 
based on Wilcoxon median tests.  
 
Event year DA rank 
-1 1 2 3 4 
Panel A: Unadjusted ROAs 
Low 16.42 16.29 15.21 14.65 14.28 
High 17.55 15.06 13.06 12.67 12.41 
-1.14 1.23 2.16 1.97 1.87 Low-High 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High-L 19.14 16.11 12.77 11.94 11.58 
High-H 15.79 14.16 13.22 13.19 12.97 
Panel B: Abnormal ROAs 
0.00 1.71 3.06 3.17 2.96 Low (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.00 -0.86 -0.74 -0.04 -0.08 High (0.782) (0.006) (0.269) (0.836) (0.459) 
0.00 2.57 3.81 3.20 3.05 Low-High (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.00 -1.62 -2.30 -1.80 -1.03 High-L (0.745) (0.002) (0.007) (0.090) (0.253) 
0.00 -0.17 0.37 1.20 1.13 High-H (0.866) (0.526) (0.165) (0.030) (0.015) 
Panel C: Cumulative changes in abnormal ROAs 
 1.69 3.06 3.00 3.09 Low  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 -0.91 -0.81 -0.22 -0.17 High  (0.003) (0.227) (0.965) (0.514) 
 2.60 3.87 3.22 3.26 Low-High  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 -1.57 -2.22 -1.85 -1.09 High-L  (0.001) (0.006) (0.071) (0.237) 
 -0.13 0.26 1.02 1.07 High-H  (0.435) (0.189) (0.038) (0.018) 
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Table 6 
Actual Repurchase Activity 
This table presents the actual buyback activity for DA quintiles (Panel A) and Tobit regression results (Panel B).  
The actual buyback amount is obtained from quarterly cash flow statements on funds used to redeem stock during 
the first year of repurchase announcement, and adjusted for concurrent changes in preferred stock.  N is the number 
of firms with available actual buyback information. Firms without actual buyback information are excluded from the 
analysis.  Actual Buy is the actual buyback amount divided by average market value of equity.  Actual/Intend is 
the ratio of shares firms actually bought back to shares firms announced to buy back.  The rows of “Low-High” test 
the differences between the top and bottom DA quintiles. ***, **, and * indicate the significance level of 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively.  High-L (High-H) represents the highest DA quintile with prior one-quarter abnormal return 
that is below (above) the average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest DA quintile firms.  All numbers 
on top of each cell are mean values, and numbers in the bracket are medians.  The dependent variable in Tobit 
regressions of Panel B is the actual buyback amount relative to market value of equity (in %). DA quintile (1 is the 
smallest) is the quintile ranking of DA obtained from the Jones (1991) model.  High DA dummy is l for the top DA 
quintile, and 0 elsewhere.  High-L dummy is 1 if a sample firm belongs to the top DA quintile and its one quarter 
return prior to repurchase announcement is below the average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest DA 
quintile firms, and 0 elsewhere.  Size decile (1 being the smallest) is based on the market value of equity at the 
month-end prior to the repurchase announcement.  % shares announced is the percentage of announced repurchase 
shares relative to total outstanding shares at month-end prior to the announcement. Abnormal announcement return 
is the difference between the sample firm’s compounded five-day return over days –2 to +2 relative to the 
announcement and the compounded return of the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period.  Prior 
one-year abnormal return is the prior one year buy-and-hold returns compounded from 252 days before (or the 
listing date) up to three days before the announcement for repurchasing firms minus the compounded return of the 
matching firms over the same period.  B/M quintile (1 being the lowest) is based on the ratio of the book equity 
value at the previous fiscal year-end to total market value at month-end prior to the announcement.  CASH quintile 
is based on the industry median-adjusted cash plus short-term investments over total assets.  LEV quintile is based 
on the industry median-adjusted ratio of the total debt to total assets at the previous fiscal year-end. High BM dummy 
is l for the top BM quintile, and 0 elsewhere.  High CASH dummy is 1 for the top CASH quintile, and 0 elsewhere.  
Low LEV dummy is 1 for the bottom LEV quintile, and 0 elsewhere.  Four-year abnormal return is the 
buy-and-hold return compounded from three days after the announcement date up to the fourth anniversary of 
announcement date for repurchasing firms minus the compounded return of the matching firms over the same period. 
Year dummy variables are included, but not reported.  Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
Panel A: Actual buyback ratios 
DA rank N Actual Buy Intend Buy Actual/Intend 
All 6365 0.0520 [ 0.0325 ] 
0.0745 
[ 0.0560 ] 
0.5793 
[ 0.6026 ] 
Low 869 0.0538 [ 0.0356 ] 
0.0759 
[ 0.0600 ] 
0.5789 
[ 0.6021 ] 
2 1482 0.0555 [ 0.0344 ] 
0.0737 
[ 0.0559 ] 
0.5954 
[ 0.6344 ] 
3 1524 0.0493 [ 0.0308 ] 
0.0725 
[ 0.0540 ] 
0.5807 
[ 0.5896 ] 
4 1468 0.0527 [ 0.0329 ] 
0.0735 
[ 0.0550 ] 
0.5865 
[ 0.6280 ] 
High 1022 0.0481 [ 0.0301 ] 
0.0788 
[ 0.0570 ] 
0.5437 
[ 0.5571 ] 
 0.0046*** -0.0030 0.0351** Low – High   [ 0.0055***] [ 0.0030 ] [ 0.0450**] 
High-L 511 0.0455 [ 0.0282 ] 
0.0747 
[ 0.0554 ] 
0.5343 
[ 0.5249 ] 
High-H 511 0.0507 [ 0.0330 ] 
0.0829 
[ 0.0580 ] 
0.5531 
[ 0.5744 ] 
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Table 6 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Tobit regressions of actual buyback ratio 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 1.178  3.315  0.830  2.985  0.664 2.966  
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.114) (0.000) (0.201) (0.000) 
DA quintile -0.144  -0.150       
 (0.028) (0.022)      
High DA dummy   -0.487  -0.541   -0.535  
   (0.034) (0.019)  (0.020) 
High-L dummy     -0.549  
     (0.074)  
Size decile 0.081  0.016  0.074  0.008  0.081 0.005  
 (0.014) (0.623) (0.027) (0.796) (0.015) (0.873) 
% shares announced   0.259  0.264  0.259  0.264  0.259 0.263  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Abnormal announcement return  -0.329  -0.411  -0.291  -0.376  -0.338 -0.344  
 (0.783) (0.730) (0.807) (0.753) (0.776) (0.773) 
Prior one-year abnormal return  0.409  0.562  0.407  0.553   0.546  
 (0.092) (0.020) (0.094) (0.022)  (0.024) 
BM quintile   0.471   0.464   0.475 0.935  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
CASH quintile   0.184   0.192   0.194 -0.058  
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.791) 
LEV quintile   0.015   0.024   0.022 0.207  
 (0.827)  (0.717)  (0.740) (0.300) 
High BM dummy  0.947   0.939     
  (0.000)  (0.000)    
High CASH dummy  -0.074   -0.044     
  (0.736)  (0.841)    
Low LEV dummy  0.215   0.188     
  (0.284)  (0.348)    
Four-year abnormal return      0.164  
      (0.031) 
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Table 7 
Long-Run Abnormal Returns Based on a Five-Factor Model 
 
This table reports long-run abnormal returns based on the five-factor model. In addition to four factors used in Carhart (1997), we add one more factor, DA factor 
in the analysis.  Excess returns of repurchasing firms are regressed against factors.  The five-factor model is specified as follows.   
ttttttftmtftp egGMBwWMLhHMLsSMBRRRR +++++−+=− )( ,,,, βα  
where Rp is the repurchase firm portfolio return, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm is the market portfolio return, SMB is the small-firm portfolio return minus big-firm 
portfolio return, HML is the high book-to-market portfolio return minus low book-to-market portfolio return, WML is the winner portfolio return minus loser 
portfolio return, and GMB is the good earnings quality portfolio return minus bad earnings quality portfolio return.  In each month from 1983 to 2000, we form 
a calendar-time portfolio by including sample firms that have announced repurchase programs in the past 48 months.  The portfolio returns are computed by 
either equal-weighting or log value-weighting individual firm’s returns.  Months with less than 60 stocks in the portfolio are excluded from the regression. N is 
the number of months used to run regressions.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  The rows labeled “Low-High” test the differences between the top and 
bottom DA quintiles, by taking long on the lowest DA quintile and short on the highest DA quintile, and regress against factors.  High-L (High-H) represents the 
highest DA quintile with prior one-quarter abnormal return that is below (above) the average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest DA quintile firms. 
 
Equal-weights Log value-weights DA rank α β s h w g N Adj. R2 α β s h w g N Adj. R2 
0.0026  0.8596  0.3415 0.1695 -0.2490 -0.2919 216 92.58% 0.0029  0.8723 0.2991 0.1648 -0.2355 -0.3057 216 93.02% All 
  (3.24) (43.41) (13.59) (5.27) (-11.17) (-6.97)     (3.76) (45.34) (12.25) (5.28) (-10.87) (-7.51)    
0.0034  0.8590  0.4357 0.1887 -0.2606 -0.2190 163 87.24% 0.0039  0.8783 0.4112 0.1737 -0.2614 -0.2417 163 87.78% Low (2.92) (27.59) (12.68) (4.00) (-8.05) (-3.85)   (3.35) (28.37) (12.04) (3.70) (-8.12) (-4.27)   
0.0038  0.8775  0.3058 0.1617 -0.2463 -0.2990 199 90.30% 0.0041  0.8863 0.2658 0.1489 -0.2316 -0.3151 199 90.75% 2 (3.87) (36.18) (9.89) (4.03) (-9.09) (-5.84)   (4.20) (37.23) (8.76) (3.78) (-8.71) (-6.27)   
0.0031  0.8561  0.2386 0.2318 -0.2269 -0.3010 194 90.23% 0.0032  0.8710 0.1966 0.2235 -0.2137 -0.3180 194 90.69% 3 (3.47) (36.37) (8.72) (6.44) (-9.40) (-6.74)   (3.66) (37.42) (7.26) (6.28) (-8.96) (-7.20)   
0.0033  0.8736  0.3496 0.2037 -0.2480 -0.3437 192 88.76% 0.0034  0.8839 0.3093 0.2017 -0.2343 -0.3528 192 89.36% 4 (3.21) (32.39) (11.13) (4.86) (-8.92) (-6.72)   (3.42) (33.66) (10.11) (4.94) (-8.66) (-7.08)   
0.0007  0.7981  0.4767 0.1877 -0.3024 -0.1973 162 84.82% 0.0010  0.8152 0.4491 0.1734 -0.2938 -0.2308 162 86.04% High  (0.59) (24.08) (13.38) (3.76) (-8.91) (-3.32)    (0.83) (25.58) (13.11) (3.62) (-9.00) (-4.04)   
0.0032  0.0462  -0.0332 0.0138 0.0325 -0.0031 199 7.17% 0.0033  0.0515 -0.0318 0.0128 0.0240 0.0075 199 7.87% Low - High (2.87) (1.57) (-0.95) (0.30) (1.07) (-0.06)   (3.00) (1.81) (-0.94) (0.29) (0.81) (0.14)   
-0.0005  0.8200  0.5614 0.1947 -0.3660 -0.1270 122 80.20% -0.0002 0.8449 0.5466 0.1900 -0.3605 -0.1599 122 81.69% High-L (-0.27) (16.77) (11.41) (2.88) (-8.04) (-1.58)   (-0.09) (17.86) (11.48) (2.90) (-8.19) (-2.06)   
0.0039  0.7223  0.4299 0.2198 -0.2676 -0.1547 124 82.72% 0.0041  0.7357 0.4048 0.2133 -0.2593 -0.1817 124 84.05% High-H (2.77) (18.85) (11.20) (4.06) (-7.48) (-2.41)    (3.04) (20.06) (11.02) (4.12) (-7.57) (-2.96)   
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Table 8 
Cash and Leverage Ranked by Discretionary Accruals 
 
This table presents cash and leverage sorted by discretionary accruals (DA) quintiles. Cash is defined as cash plus 
short-term investments over total assets and is adjusted for industry median.  Leverage is based on the ratio of the 
total debt to total assets and is adjusted for industry median.  Year -1 is the fiscal year prior to the repurchase 
announcement while Year 1 is the fiscal year which contains the repurchase announcement.  N is the number of 
firms in each group with available cash and leverage.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  The row labeled 
“Low-High” tests the difference between the top and bottom DA quintiles.  High-L (High-H) represents the highest 
DA quintile with prior one-quarter abnormal return that is below (above) the average prior one-quarter abnormal 
return of the highest DA quintile firms. 
 
Cash Leverage DA rank N 
Year -1 Year 1 Year -1 to 1 Year -1 Year 1 Year -1 to 1 
0.0905 0.0870  -0.0035  0.0149 0.0128  -0.0022  Low 994 (16.47) (15.80)  (-0.98)  (2.25) (1.86)  (-0.56)  
0.0628  0.0535  -0.0093  -0.0141 -0.0122  0.0019  2 1754 (16.31)  (14.47)  (-4.11)  (-3.04) (-2.61)  (0.86)  
0.0395  0.0336  -0.0059  -0.0260 -0.0217  0.0044  3 1899 (10.93)  (10.12)  (-2.99)  (-6.27) (-5.24)  (2.15)  
0.0403  0.0348  -0.0055  -0.0377 -0.0341  0.0036  4 1719 (10.48)  (9.22)  (-2.46)  (-8.16) (-7.46)  (1.60)  
0.0337  0.0326  -0.0011  -0.0258 -0.0273  -0.0016  High 1168 (7.39)  (7.07)  (-0.36)  (-4.20) (-4.61)  (-0.49)  
 0.0567  0.0544  -0.0023  0.0407  0.0401  -0.0006  Low – High 
 (7.95)  (7.57)  (-0.50)  (4.50)  (4.42) (-0.12) 
0.0498 0.0422  -0.0076  -0.0348 -0.0312  0.0036  High-L 583 (7.19) (6.22)  (-1.63)  (-4.11) (-3.75)  (0.78)  
0.0178 0.0231  0.0053  -0.0168 -0.0235  -0.0067  High-H 585 (3.02) (3.70)  (1.31 ) (-1.89) (-2.77)  (-1.51)  
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Table 9 
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Long-Run Abnormal Returns 
This table reports cross-sectional regression results of long-run abnormal returns. The dependent variable is 
four-year abnormal stock return. DA quintile (1 is the smallest) is the quintile ranking of DA obtained from the Jones 
(1991) model.  High DA dummy is l for the top DA quintile, and 0 elsewhere.  High-L dummy is 1 if a sample firm 
belongs to the top DA quintile and its one-quarter abnormal return prior to repurchase announcement is below the 
average prior one-quarter abnormal return of the highest DA quintile firms, and 0 elsewhere.  Size decile (1 being 
the smallest) is based on the market value of equity at the month-end prior to the repurchase announcement. B/M 
quintile (1 being the lowest) is based on the ratio of the book equity value at the previous fiscal year-end to total 
market value at month-end prior to the announcement.  CASH quintile is based on the industry median-adjusted 
cash plus short-term investment over total assets.  LEV quintile is based on the industry median-adjusted ratio of 
the total debt to total assets at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. High BM dummy is l for the top BM 
quintile, and 0 elsewhere.  High CASH dummy is 1 for the top CASH quintile, and 0 elsewhere.  Low LEV dummy 
is 1 for the bottom LEV quintile, and 0 elsewhere. % shares announced is the percentage of announced repurchase 
shares relative to total outstanding shares at the month-end prior to the announcement.  Prior one-year abnormal 
return is the prior one year buy-and-hold returns compounded from 252 days before (or the listing date) up to three 
days before the announcement for repurchasing firms minus the compounded return of the matching firms over the 
same period.  Actual buyback is the actual buyback amount divided by average market value of equity. High-DA 
dummy is used (except for model 7) for the interactive dummy with Actual buyback.  Year dummy variables are 
included, but not reported.  Numbers in parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics.  
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept 0.0725 0.2350 0.1017 0.2611 -0.0213 0.1535 0.1598 
 (0.74) (3.45) (1.03) (3.79) (0.24) (2.62) (2.77) 
DA quintile -0.0334 -0.0315 -0.0445 -0.0425    
 (-2.87) (-2.72) (-3.52) (-3.37)    
High DA dummy     -0.1076 -0.1029  
     (-2.05) (-1.96)  
High-L dummy       -0.2301 
       (-3.25) 
Size decile 0.0165 0.0163 0.0174 0.0171 0.0159  0.0161 0.0152 
 (3.02) (3.08) (3.17) (3.22) (2.87) (3.00) (2.85) 
BM quintile 0.0083  0.0082  0.0058    
 (0.70)  (0.69)  (0.49)   
CASH quintile 0.0056  0.0056  0.0090    
 (0.50)  (0.51)  (0.81)   
LEV quintile 0.0425  0.0417  0.0450    
 (3.61)  (3.54)  (3.84)   
High BM dummy  0.0180  0.0161  0.0138 0.0102 
  (0.39)  (0.35)  (0.30) (0.22) 
High CASH dummy  0.0750  0.0738  0.0855 0.0836 
  (1.89)  (1.86)  (2.16) (2.12) 
Low LEV dummy  -0.1256  -0.1223  -0.1308 -0.1307 
  (-3.60)  (-3.50)  (-3.76) (-3.76) 
% shares announced 0.3837 0.4017 0.3796 0.3979 0.3842  0.4007 0.3967 
 (1.83) (1.92) (1.81) (1.90) (1.82) (1.90) (1.88) 
Prior one-year abnormal return 0.0194 0.0238 0.0224 0.0269 0.0257  0.0290 0.0114 
 (0.46) (0.57) (0.53) (0.65) (0.61) (0.69) (0.26) 
Actual buyback 0.4762 0.4891 0.3326 0.3485 0.3365  0.3521 0.3789 
 (1.99) (2.06) (1.36) (1.44) (1.36) (1.43) (1.57) 
Actual buyback × High DA (or High-L) dummy   1.2118 1.1884 1.2443  1.2146 1.8060 
   (2.00) (1.96) (1.75) (1.71) (1.95) 
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Figure 1 
Operating Performance based on Earnings Components around Repurchase Announcement 
 
This figure plots operating performance based on earnings components for the Highest (DA5) and Lowest (DA1) DA quintiles.  Earnings are operating income 
after depreciation.  Accruals are defined as changes in non-cash current assets, minus changes in current liabilities (excluding short-term debt and taxes payable) 
minus depreciation.  Cash flows are earnings less accruals.  Earnings, accruals, cash flows and sales are scaled by average total assets.  These graphs plot 
performance from year -5 to year -1 prior to repurchase announcement, where year -1 is the fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement.  High-L (High-H) 
plot evidence where the Highest DA quintile is sub-divided into two groups by whether the prior one-quarter abnormal return is below (High-L) or above 
(High-H) the average for all firms in the highest DA quintile. 
 
Panel A: Low DA vs. High DA 
Panel B. High-L vs. High-H 
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